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Roper’s Unfinished Business:
A New Approach to
Young Offender Death Penalty Eligibility
NICHOLE M. AUSTIN†
I.

INTRODUCTION

The early 2000s witnessed an important sea change in
American death penalty jurisprudence. First, the Supreme
Court’s momentous 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia
categorically exempted the intellectually disabled from the
death penalty.1 Central to the Court’s reasoning was the
proposition that societal standards of decency put the
practice of executing such individuals within the scope of the
Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments”
prohibition.2 In Atkins, the Court did not initially prescribe
a method for determining the presence of intellectual
disability, leaving the states to carry out the Court’s ruling.3
Informed by the Court’s analysis of intellectual disability,
the states have relied on IQ testing and professional
†JD class of 2021, University at Buffalo School of Law. The author would like to

thank Professor Guyora Binder for his thoughtful insights on this Comment, as
well as the Buffalo Law Review members for their diligent and excellent work in
the editing process.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–321 (2002).
2. See id. at 316.
3. Id. at 317.
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evaluation of offenders’ adaptive behaviors to determine who
may fall into the intellectual disability exemption. Later
Supreme Court guidance has made this methodology a
requirement.
Three years after Atkins, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Roper v. Simmons created another categorical exemption
in the form of a “bright-line” rule prohibiting the execution
of offenders convicted of capital crimes committed before the
age of 18. As in Atkins, the Court found that national
evolving standards of decency regarded the practice of
executing juvenile offenders as a form of cruel and unusual
punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. In the
Court’s words, “[Eighteen years old] is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood
and adulthood and [is] the age at which the line for death
eligibility ought to rest.”4
Sixteen years later, a new evolving standards of decency
argument is emerging in support of raising the death
eligibility age to twenty-one due to greater scientific
understanding of the lingering developmental immaturity
among such individuals. While well intentioned, this
argument misses the mark. As this Comment will illustrate,
duplicating Roper’s bright-line rule approach for older
offenders is antithetical to demands that the death penalty
be reserved for the most culpable offenders. This is because
the criterion for inclusion in the Roper exemption is mere
age, which excludes assessment of offenders on the basis of
attributes and mental culpability. For this reason, the Roper
bright-line rule suffers from arbitrary application.5 Simply
expanding the Roper exemption will only replicate this
problem. Rather, any new exemption for young adult
offenders should be made consistent with Atkins and its
progeny, which require an attribute-driven assessment of
death eligibility grounded on clinical tools for diagnosing
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005).
5. See infra Section II.B.2.
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intellectual disability. The Atkins approach, much more so
than Roper, emphasizes individual characteristics and the
capacity for mental culpability, and presents a superior
model for death penalty exemption.
Though adopting an Atkins-like approach for young
offenders would require the rejection of age-defined brightline rules, this Comment will further demonstrate that the
current state of neuroscience and clinical psychology
suggests that the idea may be much more feasible than is
commonly presumed. It is important to emphasize that this
Comment does not seek to present a complete framework for
a new young offender exemption. Instead, the objective of the
present inquiry is to challenge the assumption that the
Atkins approach is impossible to apply to young offenders
and to demonstrate its viability. In the process, this
Comment provides some insight into what an attributedriven assessment of young offenders might entail in the
context of death penalty eligibility, including tools and
methodologies already available from modern science.
II. THE ROAD TO EXEMPTING JUVENILES
FROM THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Evolving Standards
The Fourteenth Amendment empowers the Supreme
Court to review the states’ imposition of the death penalty
and hold such punishment up to the rigors of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”6 In full, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause asserts, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”7 To date, the Court has declined to find that the
death penalty is unconstitutional per se under the Eighth

6. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Amendment.8 However, the Court has deemed certain
applications of the death penalty to be unconstitutional, such
as its imposition in cases involving juveniles, the
intellectually disabled, and non-homicide crimes.9 In the
twentieth century, the Court has principally used as its
guide an “evolving standards of decency” test in delimiting
such cruel and unusual punishments.10
Development of Eighth Amendment evolving standards
of decency doctrine has roots in the 1910 case Weems v.
United States.11 In Weems, the Court considered the meaning
of cruel and unusual punishment in evaluating the
constitutionality of a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment
and “hard and painful labor” imposed on a US officer for the
crime of falsifying government documents.12 The Court noted
that the meaning of the term was not static “but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.”13 In the later case Trop v. Dulles, which involved the

8. For discussion, see John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The
Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1916–
19 (2012).
9. See id. at 1918–19. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), prohibited
imposition of the death penalty for non-homicide child rape, although the decision
has been interpreted as applying to nonhomicide crimes generally. See Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (citing Kennedy, 551 U.S. at 437–38).
10. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)
(plurality opinion)). As this Comment focuses on evolving standards of decency
doctrine, earlier history of the constitutionality of the death penalty will not be
explored.
11. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
12. Id. at 357. Additional features of the sentence included “a chain at the
ankle and wrist of the offender, . . . no assistance from friend or relative, no
marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even
in the family council,” and post-imprisonment limitations in personal liberties.
Id. at 366. The sentence was imposed by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands, which was a U.S. territory at the time. See generally Victoria Reyes, After
More Than a Century, Did the Philippines Finally Break Free from the United
States?, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020, 6:00 AM) https://www.washingtonpost
.com/outlook/2020/02/21/after-more-than-century-did-philippines-finally-breakfree-united-states/.
13. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
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constitutionality of stripping a military deserter of US
nationality, the Court referred to the Eighth Amendment
analysis of Weems, concluding that cruel and unusual
punishment draws meaning from “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”14
The Court in Furman v. Georgia, in a per curiam
decision, ruled that the death penalty as applied in the cases
at bar constituted cruel and unusual punishment.15 The
decision was 5-4, with each of the nine Justices issuing their
own opinion.16 Though the decision struck down existing US
death penalty laws, the moratorium was short lived.17 Four
years after Furman, the Court issued a contrary decision in
Gregg v. Georgia18 (and in two companion cases, Jurek v.
Texas19 and Proffitt v. Florida20). In Gregg, the Court ruled
that Georgia’s death penalty statute, amended in the wake
of Furman, was constitutional.21 Important to the Court’s
reasoning was the legislative response to Furman, which
appeared to militate against the standards of decency case
for per se rejection of the death penalty.22 At the time of the
decision, thirty-five states had enacted new death penalty

14. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
16. Id.
17. Bessler, supra note 8, at 1913.
18. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
19. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is not
per se unconstitutional and upholding Texas sentencing procedures).
20. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is
not per se unconstitutional and upholding Florida sentencing procedures).
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162–63, 196–207 (“The basic concern of Furman
centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously
and arbitrarily. . . . The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus
the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant. . . . No longer can a
jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”).
22. Id. at 179–81.
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statutes to address the concerns of the Furman Court.23
Considering such facts, the Court reasoned, “[I]t is now
evident that a large proportion of American society continues
to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and
necessary criminal sanction.”24
The Gregg opinion is notable for presenting the evolving
standards of decency analysis as a two-part test to be applied
to death penalty cases. The two prongs of the Court’s
evolving standards of decency analysis are: first, a search for
“objective indicia” of national consensus on the
appropriateness of imposition of the death penalty for
particular crimes;25 and second, whether the death penalty
serves the penological purposes of deterrence and
retribution.26 The modern test for death penalty
constitutionality still employs this two-prong test, and it has
been central to later cases most relevant to this Comment,
namely, Atkins v. Virginia, decided in 2002, and Roper v.
Simmons, decided in 2005. Using the evolving standards of
decency doctrine, Atkins and Roper established, respectively,
categorical exemptions to the death penalty for the
intellectually disabled27 and juvenile offenders. The
following section explores these cases in more detail.

23. Id. (finding, for example, that new state statutes “specif[ied] the factors to
be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital
sentence . . .”).
24. Id. at 179. In notable contrast, that same year, the Court ruled in Woodson
v. North Carolina that mandatory death sentences violated the Eighth
Amendment, describing such sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”
and concluding that they were no longer accepted in modern American society.
428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); see also Bessler, supra note 8, at 1914.
25. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
26. Id. at 183.
27. Note that Supreme Court in Atkins used the term “mentally retarded” in
its decision. This Comment employs the term “intellectual disability,” which is
the preferred modern clinical terminology. See infra notes 37–39 and
accompanying text.
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B. A Tale of Two Categorical Exemptions
Of the categorical exemptions from the death penalty
established by the Supreme Court, two cases, Atkins and
Roper, are especially conceptually linked. Indeed, Atkins
featured prominently in the Court’s reasoning in Roper,
decided a mere three years after the Atkins decision. As
Atkins dealt with intellectually disabled defendants and
Roper dealt with juveniles, at issue in each case was the
peculiar mental deficiencies of each category of individuals,
making them less criminally culpable and rendering the
death penalty inappropriate.
However, the categorical approaches of Atkins and Roper
differ significantly. In particular, while the Court in Atkins
observed the importance of IQ tests in identifying
intellectually disabled offenders, the justices did not insist on
a bright-line rule establishing a maximum IQ cut-off point.28
Rather, the Court acknowledged that intellectual disability
involves not just “subaverage intellectual functioning” but
also
deficiencies
in
“adaptive
skills,”
including
“communication, self-care, and self-direction.”29 Noting these
parameters, the Court left the task of determining which
offenders fall into the exemption up to the states.30
In contrast, the Roper decision established a definitive
bright-line rule, exempting from the death penalty offenders
who committed their offenses before the age of eighteen.
Under this rule, the inquiry into applicability of the
exemption ends at identification of the offender’s birthdate
at the date of the crime. Unlike the intellectually disabled, a
court need not examine a juvenile offender’s mental
28. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (highlighting
multifaceted definitions of “mental retardation” utilized by the medical
community); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic:
Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment,
33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 212–14 (2003).
29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
30. Id. at 317.
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attributes to determine eligibility for the exemption. A
detailed exploration of these crucial cases follows.
1. Atkins and Exempting the Intellectually Disabled
The Court in Atkins offered three primary rationales for
exempting the intellectually disabled from the death
penalty.31 First, the Court recognized that a national
consensus had developed against executing the intellectually
disabled.32 This determination was not based on the sheer
number of states that had the exemption, but rather on the
rapid “procession” of states that established the exemption
from 1988 to 2001.33 In this thirteen-year period, nineteen
states and the federal government implemented the
exemption.34 Even in those states without the prohibition,
actual execution of the intellectually disabled was
uncommon.35
Second, the Court argued that the execution of the
intellectually disabled failed to serve deterrent or retributive
purposes, as required by Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence.36 With regard to retribution, the Court noted
that it has consistently required that the death penalty be
reserved for the most serious crimes.37 As such, the Court
has rejected the imposition of the death penalty when the
offender did not exhibit depravity beyond that of the average

31. See generally Fagan, supra note 28.
32. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–16.
33. Id. at 313–15. The Court noted that the shift occurred in reaction to both
the 1986 execution of Jerome Bowden, an intellectually disabled offender
convicted of murder and the Court’s refusal to prohibit the execution of the
intellectually disabled in the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh. For details of the
case, abrogated by Atkins, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 316.
36. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
319.
37. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
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murderer.38 The Atkins Court reasoned that if the culpability
of the average murderer could not justify the death penalty,
then the lesser culpability of an intellectually disabled
offender certainly could not justify the death penalty.
Furthermore, the Court rejected that executing the
intellectually disabled could serve a deterrent purpose,
because such individuals lack the capacity to evaluate the
risk of the penalty before deciding to offend and would not
likely be deterred by the penalty.39 In addition, the Atkins
Court observed that the intellectually disabled face a
heightened risk of wrongful execution.40 In particular, these
individuals face an enhanced risk of false confessions, and
they may also be less able to demonstrate mitigating factors
that call for less severe punishment or assist their counsel in
their defense.41
The Court cited the definition of intellectual disability
provided by the American Association of Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)42 as well as the
American
Psychiatric
Association’s
(APA)
similar
43
definition. The current definition of intellectual disability
38. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (holding that a death
sentence for two murders committed under conditions of “extreme emotional
trauma” where the victims died instantaneously was not justified).
39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20 (“The theory of deterrence in capital
sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the
punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct.
Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these
defendants less morally culpable—for example, the diminished ability to
understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that they
can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a
result, control their conduct based upon that information.”).
40. Id. at 321.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 308 n.3. The AAIDD was known at the time as the American
Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) and, accordingly, provided a
definition on “mental retardation” rather than “intellectual disability.” See About
Us, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, https://www.aaidd.org
/about-aaidd (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. The APA definition used was also for “mental
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involves limitations in intellectual functions, such as in
learning, reasoning, and problem solving.44 An IQ test of
seventy or as high as seventy-five generally indicates
intellectual limitation.45 Adaptive behavior includes
conceptual skills, such as language and literacy, number
concepts, and self-direction; social skills, such as
interpersonal skills and social responsibility; and practical
skills, such as activities of daily living.46 In addition, another
key hallmark of intellectual disability is that symptoms
manifest before the age of twenty-two.47
In order to conform to Atkins, the states have turned to
clinical definitions of intellectual disability provided by the
AAIDD, the APA, and the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders.48 As a result, the states have typically
implemented Atkins by identifying a three-prong test for
intellectual disability. These prongs include: (1) significant
subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) deficient adaptive
behaviors; and (3) onset of such symptoms before the age of
eighteen.49 The test has been set by state statutes or
established by the courts themselves.50 Significant
subaverage intellectual functioning is regarded as
measurable intelligence falling approximately two standard

retardation.”
44. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
https://www.aaidd.org/intellectual-disability
/definition (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 170 F. Supp. 3d 347, 352–53 (E.D.N.Y.
2016).
49. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2021).
50. See James W. Ellis et. al., Evaluating Intellectual Disability: Clinical
Assessments in Atkins Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2018). As noted in
Wilson, Cal. Penal Code § 1376 provides an example of a statutory definition of
intellectual disability. 170 F. Supp. 3d at 352–53 (an example of court-developed
doctrine).
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deviations from the mean score of one hundred.51 Thus, an
IQ score of approximately seventy to seventy-five or less
indicates intellectual disability.52 The IQ tests likely to
appear in court in Atkins cases are the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scales and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale.53 Short-form versions of IQ tests, which take
considerably less administration time, may be used and
submitted to courts, though reliance on such tests may be
considered controversial.54
2. Roper and Exempting Juvenile Offenders
Three years after Atkins, the Court decided the issue of
juvenile death eligibility in Roper v. Simmons. Prior to
Roper, the Court had set aside a death sentence for a fifteenyear-old offender in the plurality decision of Thompson v.
Oklahoma.55 Four Justices in that case ruled that evolving
standards of decency precluded executing offenders under
the age of sixteen at the time of their crimes.56 However,
Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, did not endorse this
proposition, asserting that more evidence was needed, and
the issue was left undecided.57 The following year, the
majority of the Court denied that a national consensus
regarded the execution of juvenile offenders58 as cruel and
51. Ellis et al., supra note 50, at 1327.
52. Id. at 1328.
53. Id. at 1347–49.
54. Id. at 1354–56.
55. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
56. Id. at 818–38. The four Justices were Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
57. Id. at 848–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Although I believe that a
national consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed
before the age of 16 very likely does exist, I am reluctant to adopt this conclusion
as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess.”).
58. Note that, prior to Roper, an offender who had committed a capital crime
as a juvenile might not have been sentenced to death or actually executed until
the offender surpassed the age of eighteen. This Comment uses the term “juvenile
offender” to refer to those who committed their offenses before the age of eighteen
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unusual punishment in Stanford v. Kentucky.59
Though juvenile offender executions were not prohibited
before Roper, youth could be considered as a mitigating
factor in deciding whether death was justified in capital
cases involving juvenile offenders. In Roper, the defendant’s
youth was submitted to the jury as a mitigating factor to
forestall the penalty of death.60 Nonetheless, the jury
recommended the death sentence, which the court
subsequently imposed on the defendant.61 In fact, the
prosecution used the factor of youth as a reason to impose the
death penalty, saying to the jury, “Think about age.
Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? . . . Mitigating? Quite
the contrary I submit.”62
Simmons unsuccessfully petitioned for postconviction
relief on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel. 63
However, after the Atkins decision in 2002, Simmons again
petitioned for relief on the grounds that Atkins prohibited
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.64 The
Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with this proposition and
set aside the death sentence.65 The court specifically cited the
development of a national consensus against executing
juvenile offenders.66
The Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri high court’s
without respect to whether the individual would have been sentenced to death or
executed while still a juvenile.
59. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
60. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 953 (1997) (affirming Simmons’ conviction); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235
F.3d 1124, 1127, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001) (denying Simmons’ writ of
habeas corpus).
64. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 399.
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decision in Roper.67 With regard to the national consensus
prong of the evolving standards of decency analysis, the
Court observed that, even in the twenty states that did not
prohibit juvenile execution at the time of the Court’s opinion,
the practice was not common, and only three states had
performed such executions in the decade preceding the
decision.68 The rate of change in reducing or abolishing the
practice was notably slower than the change that occurred
between Penry and Atkins with respect to the intellectually
disabled.69 However, as in Atkins, the Court was focused on
the “consistency of the direction of change,” rather than raw
numbers.70 Significant to the Court in Roper was the fact
that since Stanford, no state that had prohibited the death
penalty for juveniles had reinstated the penalty.71 That this
occurred in an atmosphere of “general popularity of
anticrime legislation” and signaled a trend toward “cracking
down on juvenile crimes in other respects” was likewise
notable.72 The Court also speculated that the slow rate of
change between Stanford and Roper could be explained by
the fact that twenty-seven death penalty states had already
created juvenile exemptions by the time Stanford was
decided.73 Furthermore, given that only two states had
exempted the intellectually disabled by the time Penry was
decided and Stanford and Penry were decided at the same
time, the number of juvenile exemptions preceding Stanford
suggested the prohibition had gained widespread support
earlier than exempting the intellectually disabled.74
As to the second prong of the analysis, the Court, citing
67. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561.
68. Id. at 564–65.
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id. at 566.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 566–67.
74. See id.
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Atkins, noted that the death penalty must be reserved for
offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most serious
crimes” and whose “extreme culpability” makes them the
“most deserving of execution.”75 Three features of juveniles
suggested that they should not be classified with the worst
offenders. These features included being more prone to
engage in reckless behavior, being more susceptible to
negative peer influence, and having more transitory
personality traits.76 As juveniles are more vulnerable to
immature, reckless behavior, the Court reasoned
irresponsible juvenile conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.77 Moreover, this behavior
did not denote a moral character failing on par with that of
an adult since juveniles do not yet have fully formed
characters and are amenable to reform.78
Due to the realities of juvenile psychology, the Court
denied that the death penalty could be justified by deterrent
or retributive considerations. Echoing the reasoning in
Atkins, if the death penalty is not justified for the level of
culpability for the “average murderer,” then it cannot be
justified for the lesser culpability of a juvenile.79 As for
deterrence, the Court stated that it was unclear whether
juveniles could be deterred by the death penalty, but that
their hallmark psychological features suggest that they are
less likely to engage in the cost-benefit analysis that is at the
heart of deterrence theory. Thus, since retribution and
deterrence did not adequately justify the death penalty for
juveniles, the punishment failed the second prong of the
evolving standards of decency test. For these reasons, the
Court established an unequivocal bright-line rule exempting

75. Id. at 568 (original quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 569–70.
77. Id. at 570.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 571; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); see also Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980).
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from the death penalty those who had committed capital
offenses before the age of eighteen.80 Stanford was, therefore,
overturned.81
The Court in Roper was quick to acknowledge that its
bright-line rule was vulnerable to criticisms of
arbitrariness.82 Giving short shrift to the concern, Justice
Kennedy declared simply that “a line must be drawn” and
noted the widespread societal acknowledgement that
eighteen marks the line between childhood and adulthood.83
The Court’s statement no doubt reflects pragmatic intuitions
that exempting young offenders from the death penalty
necessitates the imposition of such a line. Indeed, the Roper
bright-line rule approach is attractive for practical reasons
alluded to by Justice Kennedy. The rule provides a clear,
definitive test for exempting a class of individuals whom
society, in the main, believes ought to be exempted from the
death penalty. In addition, the bright-line approach
precludes the occurrence of controversial borderline cases by
eliminating gray areas of application. The pragmatic appeal
of the Roper rule also preempts worries over how to
objectively evaluate juvenile mental characteristics that
might otherwise serve as a basis for exemption.
Nonetheless, the foregoing rationales do not allay the
serious criticism that the Roper rule established an arbitrary
exemption from the death penalty. The Court’s reasoning,
after all, relied on the fact that juvenile brain development
and mental characteristics make them less culpable for
crimes. But under the Roper rule, offenders with presumably
very few developmental differences84 are eligible for wildly
80. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”).
83. Id.
84. For example, an offender who is 17 years and 11 months old and an
offender who is 18 years and 1 month old.

1210

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

different punishments. This result is contrary to the
proposition, articulated in Roper, that the death penalty
ought to be reserved for the most culpable offenders and for
the most serious crimes.
The above considerations underscore the difficulty with
proposals to cure the limitations of Roper by simply
increasing the death penalty exemption age to twenty-one.
In effect, advocates propose establishing another bright-line
rule with an enlarged membership category. Though
certainly this approach will exempt more individuals from
the death penalty who ought to be exempt under the Roper
rationale,85 identical problems of arbitrariness arise. That is,
the rule would deny exemption notwithstanding the fact that
an individual’s mental deficiencies and relative culpability
may be identical to an individual who is eligible for the
exemption due to age. The decision procedure would not be
based on a coherent theory of culpability but a judicially
imposed cut-off point and would be susceptible to the same
inadequacies as the Roper decision itself.
But is this result truly necessary to exempt young
offenders from the death penalty? This Comment will argue
the answer is “no.” An examination of Atkins and its
implementation suggests that an alternative approach to
young offenders is both possible and desirable. Although this
Comment does not attempt to detail a specific model for such
an approach, it instead demonstrates, as in Atkins cases,
that a court can evaluate the mental attributes and relative
culpability of young offenders in a way that is holistic,
individualized, and without reliance on arbitrary cut-off
points. To this end, the following section will set forth the
grounds for the current evolving standards of decency
argument for exempting young adults under twenty-one
from the death penalty, followed by an examination of how
Atkins has been applied in capital cases. This discussion will

85. I.e., on the basis that their mental deficiencies disqualify them from the
death penalty.
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serve as a basis for subsequent arguments that the approach
to young offender death eligibility should emulate the Atkins
approach and how it may be possible to do so.
III. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY ARGUMENT FOR
RAISING THE DEATH ELIGIBILITY AGE TO TWENTY-ONE
A. Cultural Opinion
Historically, subjecting those under the age of twentyone to the death penalty has not been widely supported in
America. For example, according to Gallup, just 26% of
Americans supported the death penalty for offenders under
twenty-one in 1936 (when 59% overall favored the death
penalty). In 1965, just 21% supported the death penalty for
those under twenty-one (when 45% favored the death
penalty overall).86 In 2018, the American Bar Association
(ABA) adopted a resolution calling on death penalty
jurisdictions to prohibit the execution of those who were
twenty-one or younger at the time of their offense. The ABA
cited the “growing medical consensus” that brain areas
concerning decision-making and judgment continue to
develop into the mid-twenties.87 As a result, “late
adolescents,” or eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-olds, have
“diminished capacity to understand the consequences of
their actions and control their behavior” similar to those
under eighteen.88 This fact, according to the ABA, is contrary
to the Eighth Amendment’s demand that punishments be
proportional and personalized to the offense and offender.89
The death penalty, the most severe form of punishment,

86. Jeffrey M. Jones, The Death Penalty, GALLUP (Aug. 12, 2009),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/9913/death-penalty.aspx.
87. ABA House Delegates Recommendation 111, 1 (adopted Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/crsj/DPDPRP/2018_hod_
midyear_111.pdf.
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id. at 11 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)).
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should be reserved for the most culpable offenders who have
committed the worst crimes in society.90 This cannot be true
of late adolescent offenders because of their diminished
rational capacities.
The ABA also cited the changing landscape of the
application of the death penalty.91 In particular, the ABA
noted that fifty-two out of fifty-three jurisdictions had life
without the possibility of parole options at the time the ABA
resolution was passed.92 Furthermore, the use of the death
penalty nationwide has declined.93 For example, the ABA
observed that in 2016, only thirty-one individuals received
the death penalty, and only two of those individuals were
under twenty-one at the time of the offense.94 Indeed, the
decline in the death penalty has only continued in
subsequent years. Though undoubtedly impacted by
disruptions in the justice system due to the COVID-19
pandemic, in 2020 only seventeen people were executed in
the US, and four were under twenty-one at the time of the
offense.95
Andrew Michaels has argued that the rarity of imposing
the death penalty on offenders eighteen to twenty-one is

90. Id.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. For comparison, the peak number of U.S. executions since the 1970s
was ninety-eight in 1999. Tom Jackman & Mark Berman, Despite Recent Federal
Flurry, Number of U.S. Executions Is Lowest Since 1991, WASH. POST (Dec. 16,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/12/16/usexecutions-decline/.
95. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., DEATH PENALTY IN 2020: YEAR END REPORT 10
(2020),
https://reports.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-end/YearEndReport2020.pdf
[hereinafter 2020 YEAR END REPORT]. The Death Penalty Information Center
attributes the particularly low number of executions in 2020 both to continued
decline in public support for the death penalty and the COVID-19 pandemic,
which delayed capital punishment proceedings. See id. at 10–12, 20.
Notwithstanding the pandemic, both death sentences and executions have been
on a precipitous decline since 1999. See id. at 9.
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sufficient to satisfy the national consensus prong of the death
penalty exemption test.96 In particular, Michaels argues that
under Graham v. Florida,97 a national consensus against a
practice can be found to exist, even if the practice is
statutorily permitted in a majority of jurisdictions, when the
punishment is rarely administered.98 Michaels argues that
executing eighteen- to-twenty-one-year-olds is relatively
infrequent, especially in light of the fact that this age group
leads in violent crimes, including murder. 99 This
demonstrates “society’s reluctance to execute young adults
despite their high offense rate . . . .”100 Furthermore, only a
small number of states are responsible for the vast majority
of executions of those in this age bracket, even though the
punishment is available in a majority of jurisdictions.101
Similarly, in Graham, the punishment rejected by the
Court—life without parole for juvenile non-homicide
offenders—was available in thirty-nine jurisdictions, but
was imposed on very few juveniles, the majority of which
were sentenced in just one state.102

96. Andrew Michaels, A Decent Proposal: Exempting Eighteen- To TwentyYear-Olds from the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 150
(2016).
97. 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (exempting juvenile non-homicide offenders from life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole).
98. Michaels, supra note 96, at 149–50 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 62–63 (2010)).
99. Id. at 170–71.
100. Id. at 171 n.197.
101. See id. at 169.
102. Graham, 560 U.S. at 64 (“[T]here are 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders
serving life without parole sentences. A significant majority of those, 77 in total,
are serving sentences imposed in Florida. The other 46 are imprisoned in just ten
States—California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. Thus, only 11 jurisdictions nationwide
in fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders—
and most of those do so quite rarely. . . .” (citations omitted)).
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B. Judicial Opinions and Death Penalty Statistics
A substantial challenge to the constitutionality of
executing offenders under twenty-one recently emerged from
the state of Kentucky. Defendants in the consolidated cases
of Commonwealth v. Bredhold and Commonwealth v. Diaz
successfully argued at the trial court level that such
executions were unconstitutional. One of the defendants was
Travis Bredhold, who was charged with murder and robbery
(among other crimes) in the shooting death of a gas station
employee, allegedly committed when Bredhold was eighteen
years and five months old.103 Efrain Diaz, Jr., and Justin
Smith were co-defendants charged with murder and robbery,
allegedly committed when Diaz was twenty years and seven
months old and Smith was eighteen and five months old.104
Though not yet convicted, the commonwealth initially gave
notice of intent to seek the death penalty in the cases. 105
Citing Roper, the defendants moved for exclusion of the
penalty.106 In 2017, the Circuit Court of Kentucky, Seventh
Division, agreed with the defendants, declaring the state’s
death penalty statute to be unconstitutional due to the
statute’s tolerance for permitting the death penalty for those
under twenty-one at the time of offense.107
The Kentucky cases provide an instructive look at
precisely how a challenge to young offender executions could
succeed. Especially important was the court’s reliance on
science and neurobiological research to assess the
appropriateness of the death penalty for under-twenty-one
offenders. The court noted the “widely accepted” notion
among neuroscientists that brain systems and structures

103. Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Ky. 2020).
104. Id. at 412–13.
105. Id. at 413.
106. Id.
107. Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *6 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017).
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which are key to “self-regulation” and “higher-order
cognition” continue to develop into the mid-twenties.108
Psychologically, these individuals are more likely to engage
in “sensation-seeking,” to have poorer impulse control, to be
less cognitively able to consider “risks and rewards of
alternate course of action,” and are much more susceptible to
peer pressure.109 The court reasoned that these psychological
features are likely attributable to a “maturational
imbalance” between the “socio-emotional system,” related to
sensation and reward seeking, and the “cognitive control
system,” which “catches up” during the mid-twenties.110 For
example, studies have shown that the “peak age for risky
decision-making” is between nineteen and twenty-one.111
One study suggested that under stress, the brain of a twentyyear-old functions similarly to a sixteen- to seventeen-yearold.112 Bredhold, for his part, was determined to be
approximately “four years behind his peer group in multiple
capacities” and to have a number of mental disorders, such
as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).113 Neuroplasticity
also factored into the court’s analysis. Those in their late
teens and early 20s have heightened plasticity, which
suggests “strong potential for behavioral change.”114 Thus,
adult criminality or antisocial behavior is difficult to predict

108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *5.
111. Id. at *4.
112. Id. at *5 (“Under emotionally neutral conditions, individuals between
eighteen (18) and twenty-one (21) were able to control their impulses just as well
as those in their mid-twenties (20s). However, under emotionally arousing
conditions, eighteen– (18) to twenty-one– (21) year-olds demonstrated levels of
impulsive behavior and patterns of brain activity comparable to those in their
mid-teens. Put simply, under feelings of stress, anger, fear, threat, etc., the brain
of a twenty- (20) year-old functions similarly to a sixteen- (16) or seventeen- (17)
year-old.”).
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *6.
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from adolescence.115 Some research suggests that 90% of
“serious juvenile offenders” discontinue criminal behavior in
adulthood.116
From the above observations, the court concluded that
twenty-one-year-olds are “categorically less culpable” in the
same ways the Supreme Court determined juveniles to be.
Particularly, they lack impulse control and the ability to
consider the consequences of their actions, and, therefore,
knowledge of the prospective punishment of death does not
have a deterrent effect.117 Moreover, their neuroplasticity
means they have a “much better chance at rehabilitation”
than adults.118 In the court’s words, “If the science in 2005
mandated the ruling in Roper, the science in 2017 mandates
this ruling.”119
The court also evaluated “objective indicia of a national
consensus” on the death penalty for offenders under twentyone. The court noted that of the states with death penalty
statutes and no governor-imposed moratorium on
executions, seven had de facto bans on executing offenders
under twenty-one.120 Combined with the states without
death penalty statutes and those with moratoria, thirty
states would not execute an offender under the age of twentyone.121 Furthermore, only nine out of the thirty-one states
with death penalty statutes had executed those under
twenty-one at the time of offense between 2011 and 2016.122
During this period, thirty-three such offenders were
executed, with Texas accounting for nineteen of those

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *4.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *3.
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executions.123 Excluding Texas as an outlier, the number of
under twenty-one-year old offender executions dropped by
50% between the period of 2001-2006 (with twenty-nine
executions of under twenty-one-year old offenders) and the
period of 2011-2016 (with fourteen executions of under
twenty-one-year old offenders).124 Like the ABA, the
Bredhold court also acknowledged the precipitous downward
trend in the use of the death penalty overall.125 Between 1999
and 2016, actual executions per year fell from ninety-eight to
twenty, with only two individuals executed who had been
under twenty-one at the time of their offenses.126 These facts
provided sufficient indication of a national consensus
opposed to the death penalty and especially for those under
twenty-one.127
However, following an interlocutory appeal by the
commonwealth in 2020, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
ruled that the issue of constitutionality of the death penalty
for those eighteen-to-twenty-one was not justiciable before
the circuit court and was not property before the state
supreme court at the time.128 As none of the defendants had
yet to be convicted or sentenced, the injury at stake was
merely hypothetical and, hence, none of the defendants had
standing.129 The supreme court vacated the circuit court
orders and remanded the cases, while not weighing in on the
constitutional issue.130 Thus, the issue of constitutionality of
executing under twenty-one-year-old offenders is unresolved

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Specifically, the court observed that from 1999 to 2016, the number of
death sentences imposed fell from 279 to 30.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Ky. 2020).
129. See id. at 416–18 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)).
130. See id. at 423.
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in Kentucky.
At first blush, the Kentucky decisions are vulnerable to
criticism that they are outlier cases that represent the
opinion of one trial court jurisdiction.131 This criticism,
however, overlooks judicial sentiment as expressed through
actual sentences given to young adult offenders. As noted by
the Kentucky circuit court, a look at national statistics shows
executions and impositions of the death penalty on young
adult offenders to be on the decline nationwide. A statistical
examination of both the general use of the death penalty and
the death penalty applied to young adult offenders give
important insight into this trend.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which
significantly disrupted criminal justice proceedings
nationally, including for capital cases, 2019 may present the
most accurate picture of death penalty trends. In 2019, a
total of twenty-two prisoners were executed and thirty-four
new death sentences were imposed in the US.132
Comparatively, in 1999, 279 death sentences were imposed
and 98 executions were carried out.133 Application of the
death penalty remained highly regionalized, with 91% of all
executions occurring in the American South, and Texas
accounted for 41% of executions overall.134 Of the eleven new
death sentences imposed in 2019, seven were in Florida.135
In contrast, no state in New England authorizes the death

131. In fact, on appeal, the prosecution in Diaz argued that no other
jurisdiction recognized the unconstitutionality of sentencing eighteen- to twentyone-year-olds to death. See Justin Madden & Jim Warner, Victim of Gas Station
Shooting Was a Family Man and a Man of Honor, Friend Says, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEDGER (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.kentucky.com/news/local/crime
/article44458410.html.
132. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 2019 YEAR END REPORT 1 (2019),
https://reports.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-end/YearEndReport2019.pdf
[hereinafter 2019 YEAR END REPORT].
133. See id.
134. See id. at 3.
135. See id. at 10.
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penalty.136
In 2020, eighteen death sentences were imposed and
seventeen executions were carried out.137 Though these
figures are undoubtedly artificially low due to the pandemic,
the Death Penalty Information Center asserted that the
United States was “poised for its sixth consecutive year with
fifty or fewer new death sentences and thirty or fewer
executions” even before the impact of the pandemic.138
Especially telling is the death penalty’s decline in both the
eyes of public opinion and in state criminal justice systems.
According to Gallup, in 2020, 55% of Americans favored the
death penalty, a near fifty-year low.139 43% of Americans
oppose the death penalty, which has not been as high since
the 1960s.140 Per the latest statistics, Americans prefer life
imprisonment to the death penalty 60% to 36%.141
The retreat of the death penalty at the state level is also
noteworthy. As of 2020, twenty-two states had abolished the
death penalty.142 Even among states that do permit the
death penalty, many have not carried out an execution in a
decade or more. To date, thirty-four states have either
abolished the death penalty or have had no executions in
over ten years.143 Moreover, executions of young adult

136. See id. at 2.
137. See 2020 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 95, at 1.
138. Id.
139. See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Support for Death Penalty Holds Above
Majority Level, GALLUP (Nov. 19, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/325568/
support-death-penalty-holds-above-majority-level.aspx. Support for the death
penalty peaked in 1994 at 80% and has been on a continuous decline since then.
See id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Colorado joined the ranks of non-death penalty states in 2020. 2020 YEAR
END REPORT, supra note 95, at 4. The year before, New Hampshire became the
twenty-first state to abolish executions. See 2019 YEAR END REPORT, supra note
132, at 1.
143. See 2020 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 95, at 4.
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offenders are on a definitive decline. Between 2006 and 2011,
the execution of young adults averaged approximately eleven
per year.144 However only six such executions occurred in
2012, five in 2013, and only three occurred in 2014 and
2015.145 Of the twenty-two individuals executed in 2019, four
were under the age of twenty-one at the time of their
crimes.146 In 2020, four of the seventeen individuals executed
were under twenty-one at the time of the offense.147
C. Disparate Treatment of Young Adults in the Law
It is a curious fact that in the United States today, the
federal government considers a twenty-year-old to be too
young to buy e-cigarettes but not too young to execute.148
Indeed, the law is rife with examples of the disparate
treatment of young adults due to their presumed
immaturity. The federal minimum drinking age law is
perhaps the most prominent example. The National
Minimum Drinking Age Act, codified in 23 USC § 158,
mandates the federal government to withhold 10% of
highway funds from states that allow the purchase or
possession of alcohol by those under twenty-one years of
age.149 The motivation for the act was the belief by
lawmakers that immature and irresponsible behavior of
individuals under the age of twenty-one contributed to traffic
fatalities. Relatedly, a majority of states have implemented
dram shop and social host liability laws that impose liability
on those who serve alcohol to those under twenty-one.150
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) is another important
144. Zoe Jordan, The Roper Extension: A California Perspective, 71 HASTINGS
L.J. 197, 204–05 (2019).
145. Id.
146. See 2019 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 132, at 16.
147. See 2020 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 95, at 20.
148. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
149. See 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(A).
150. See Michaels, supra note 96, at 153.
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example of the disparate treatment of under-twenty-one
offenders. The GCA prohibited the sale of any firearm other
than a shotgun or rifle, including concealable handguns, to
individuals under twenty-one.151 In a 2012 challenge to the
prohibition, the Fifth Circuit observed that Congress had
specifically noted that concealable firearms had been “widely
sold” to “emotionally immature, or thrill-bent juveniles and
minors prone to criminal behavior.”152 During one
congressional hearing, a law enforcement officer reported,
“The greatest growth of crime today is in the area of young
people, juveniles, and young adults. The easy availability of
weapons makes their tendency toward wild, and sometimes
irrational behavior that much more violent, that much more
deadly.”153 In upholding the sale restrictions as
constitutional, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “Congress
was focused on a particular problem: young persons under
twenty-one, who are immature and prone to violence, easily
accessing handguns, which facilitate violent crime[.]”154 The
Supreme Court declined to review the case and the ruling
remains in place.155
Disparate treatment of those under twenty-one is
evident in a number of other areas of the law. For example,
the 2008 Foster Care Act also recognizes the immaturity of
those under twenty-one. The Foster Care Act allows the
federal government to offer financial incentives for states
who extend the age of eligibility for foster care services to
twenty-one.156 In fact, the act permits states to define “child”

151. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1).
152. Michaels, supra note 96, at 151.
153. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 207 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Federal Firearms Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 57 (1967) (testimony of Sheldon S. Cohen)).
154. Id. at 208.
155. Michaels, supra note 96, at 152.
156. See id. at 154.
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as those under the age of twenty-one.157 As Andrew Michaels
describes, “Much like the GCA and the NMDA, the Foster
Care Act reinforces the notion that there is an adolescentlike quality to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.”158 Another
area of disparate treatment is in the regulation of sexually
oriented businesses. Some jurisdictions, for example, forbid
those under twenty-one from operating sexually oriented
businesses.159 Others have upheld regulations preventing
those under twenty-one from patronizing live nude
entertainment businesses160 or limiting their ability to
perform in them.161
More recently, the federal government updated the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to raise the federal
minimum tobacco products purchasing age to twenty-one.162
Effective since December 2019, the law prohibits the sale of
such products as cigarettes, cigars, and e-cigarettes to those
under twenty-one.163 Prior to the federal law’s enactment,
nineteen states had implemented their own “Tobacco 21”

157. See id. at 154–55.
158. Id. at 155.
159. See, e.g., Am. Entertainers, L.L.C. v. City of Rocky Mount, N.C., 888 F.3d
707, 722–23 (4th Cir. 2018) (upholding city ordinance forbidding those under
twenty-one to “own, manage and operate an adult business”).
160. See, e.g., 7250 Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Adams Cnty., 799 P.2d
917, 919, 926 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“[I]n light of the evidence concerning
reported property destruction and criminal activity associated with nude
entertainment establishments, we may reasonably presume that the age
restrictions in the ordinance reflect a legitimate legislative judgment by the
county commissioners that youths under 21 years of age should be protected from
the potentially harmful consequences associated with such establishments.”).
161. See, e.g., Doe I v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 105, 118 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding
that a state statute imposing twenty-one year age minimum on certain adult
entertainment performers was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague).
162. Newly Signed Legislation Raises Federal Minimum Age of Sale of Tobacco
Products to 21, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/ctp-newsroom/newly-signed-legislation-raises-federal-minimum-agesale-tobacco-products-21 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
163. Id.
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laws.164 According to the American Academy of Pediatrics,
raising the tobacco buying age to twenty-one was necessary
because adolescents and young adults are “uniquely
susceptible” to nicotine addiction due to the still-developing
nature of their brains.165
IV. APPLYING THE ATKINS APPROACH TO YOUNG OFFENDERS
Assuming that evolving standards of decency analysis
justifies a categorical exemption from the death penalty for
young offenders, the question is what form the exemption
should take. Should the Roper bright-line rule merely be
expanded to specified post-juvenile age groups, as advocated
by the ABA? Or is a different approach possible? Part IV of
this Comment will illustrate why the bright-line approach is
not ideal for young offenders. In particular, a bright-line rule
risks arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and is
inimical to the Supreme Court’s determination that the
death penalty should be reserved for the most culpable
offenders. Rather than expanding Roper, the holistic
approach taken in Atkins is the superior alternative. The
remainder of this Comment addresses how applying the
Atkins approach to post-juvenile young offenders is not only
more desirable, but also more feasible than one might
initially presume.
A. The Superiority of the Atkins Exemption
As discussed supra Part II, the Roper bright-line rule is
problematic due to its apparent arbitrariness and failure to
ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the most
culpable offenders.166 In contrast, one of the most important

164. Tobacco 21, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.aap
.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/Richmond-Center/Pages
/Tobacco-21.aspx.
165. Id.
166. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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features of the modern Atkins exemption is that, unlike
Roper, it does not employ a bright-line cutoff point using IQ
testing. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly prohibited
states from imposing a firm IQ score threshold. In 2014, the
Supreme Court ruled in Hall v. Florida that states cannot
impose a rigid IQ score to determine intellectual disability.167
The defendant in that case had taken several IQ tests, with
scores ranging from sixty to eighty.168 The scores below
seventy were excluded for evidentiary reasons, leaving
seventy-one as the lowest remaining IQ score.169 Under
Florida law at the time, a defendant would have to show an
IQ score of seventy or below before being allowed to present
any other evidence of intellectual disability, such as adaptive
behavioral evidence.170 Thus, the defendant in Hall was
prohibited from offering evidence of intellectual disability on
the basis of his seventy-one IQ score alone.171
The Court found the Florida approach to determining
intellectual disability inadequate. Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, stated that the Court would consult the
medical community for appropriate diagnosis procedures. 172
According to the Court, Florida’s IQ threshold was not in line
with the medical community in two primary ways. First, the
medical field does not hold IQ scoring as the exclusive
indicator of intellectual disability; it is assessed concurrently
with adaptive behaviors and age of symptom onset.173 By
preventing a defendant with an IQ score one point above the
threshold from presenting other evidence of intellectual
disability, Florida law did not reflect established medical
practice in diagnosing intellectual disability. Secondly, the
167. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).
168. Id. at 707.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 711–12.
172. Id. at 710.
173. Id. at 712.
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medical community does not read IQ scores as a fixed
number but as a range, taking into account the standard
error of measurement (SEM) of each score.174 Thus, Florida’s
use of a single, fixed IQ score, rather than interpreting the
score in terms of the SEM range, did not reflect established
community practice.175
Hall underscores the fact that a finding of intellectual
disability is not determined by a precise metric. This is
despite the fact that intellectual disability is a diagnosable
condition176 and despite the prevalence of standardized
diagnostic tools, such as IQ testing. Nonetheless, clinical
diagnosis of intellectual disability hinges on expert
evaluation and a constellation of factors. This suggests that
pragmatic intuitions, which exempt those with intellectual
deficiencies due to youth requiring courts to employ brightline criteria, are simply unfounded. For if clinical assessment
of the mental deficiencies of young offenders can be brought
into parity with assessment of the intellectually disabled—
and a bright-line test has been ruled out for one group, i.e.,
the intellectually disabled—a bright-line rule need not be
employed for either class of offenders.
In 2017, the Court further refined its guidance on IQ
tests in Moore v. Texas by ruling that states could not develop
idiosyncratic criteria to upwardly adjust the SEM range to
deny a defendant an intellectual disability diagnosis.177 In
Moore, the defendant had scored a seventy-four on an IQ test,
resulting in an SEM range of sixty-nine to seventy-nine.178

174. Id.
175. Id. at 714. In addition to its analysis of the medical community’s view of
intellectual disability, the Court also compared Florida’s bright-line cutoff rule
with the practice of other jurisdictions and found that the vast majority of the
states at the time rejected this approach. Id. at 718. Recall that such interjurisdictional comparison is a component of the national consensus inquiry in
capital punishment cases. See discussion supra Part II.
176. As opposed to, say, intellectual immaturity.
177. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017).
178. Id.
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As the low-end score of sixty-nine was below seventy, the
trial court hearing the case was required to move on to
evaluate the defendant’s adaptive functioning.179 However,
the trial court decided that certain factors, such as taking the
test in a depressed state, might have caused the defendant
to underperform.180 Disregarding the defendant’s low-end
score, and considering also the defendant’s score of seventyeight on another IQ test, the trial court concluded that the
defendant was not in the intellectually disabled range.181 The
Supreme Court overruled this determination as contrary to
Hall.182 The Court stated that the SEM range of sixty-nine
to seventy-nine put the defendant in the range of intellectual
disability, which already accounted for testing error.183 The
lower court could not merely cite specific sources of error to
narrow the standard-error range.184
Another important feature of the Atkins approach is its
emphasis on in-depth investigation of the personal attributes
of each offender through the adaptive behavior inquiry. In
the simplest terms, adaptive behavior refers to the
“collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have
been learned and are performed by people in their everyday
lives.”185 These skill areas can be assessed quantitatively
using standardized measurement tools that yield adaptive
behavior scores.186 To this end, the AAIDD has developed the
Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale (DABS) for clinical use

179. Id.
180. Id. at 1047.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1049.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Marc J. Tassé et al., The Relation Between Intellectual Functioning and
Adaptive Behavior in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability, 54 INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 381, 382 (2016).
186. Id.
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in determining levels of limitation in adaptive behavior.187
However, adaptive behavior assessment is not simply a
matter of administering a single instrument to an
individual.188 Evaluators examine the person’s life
functioning by performing interviews with those who know
and have observed the individual in childhood or
adulthood.189 Personal records (e.g., school and juvenile) may
also be reviewed.190 Unlike IQ testing, it is the clinical
evaluator who gathers and interprets information used in
the adaptive behavior measurement, rather than gathering
data from the offender directly.191
The Supreme Court in Moore also set limitations on the
states’ procedures for evaluating adaptive behavior in Atkins
cases. In Moore, the criminal court had further decided that
the defendant did not exhibit the requisite adaptive
deficiencies to qualify as intellectually disabled. The
Supreme Court overruled this finding as well, stating that
the state’s evaluation of the defendant’s adaptive behavior
“departed from clinical practice.”192 For example, the state
required that the defendant prove that his adaptive deficits
were not the product of a personality disorder.193 However,
modern clinical practice recognizes that many individuals
with intellectual disabilities also have comorbid disorders,
the presence of which is not considered evidence of the
absence of intellectual disability.194 The state also relied on
“lay stereotypes” to assess intellectual disability, a

187. DABS, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
https://www.aaidd.org/dabs (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).

DISABILITIES,

188. See Ellis et al., supra note 50, at 1332.
189. Id. Such individuals may include family, friends, teachers, employers,
neighbors, and others. Id. at 1380–81.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1376–84.
192. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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phenomenon eschewed by the medical profession.195 In sum,
the Supreme Court concluded that though the states have
“some flexibility” in applying Atkins, they must be
constrained by the “medical community’s current
standards.”196
While the Supreme Court has rejected bright-line rules
for intellectual disability, Moore demonstrates that the
states do not have free rein to make their own
determinations regarding identification of intellectually
disabled offenders. In essence, Moore requires states to
largely defer to the medical community’s current practices
with respect to both IQ testing and evaluation of adaptive
functioning.197 This ruling is relevant to the concern that an
Atkins-like approach to young offenders, focused on a
qualitative assessment of personal attributes, would result
in a hollow exemption if left up to the states to implement.
This may occur, for example, by giving the states the ability
to define the category so narrowly that few people would fall
into the exemption.198 Moore demonstrates that adequate
guidance from the Court is possible.
The mode of assessing adaptive functioning in Atkins
cases is significant because it demonstrates a feasible
method of systematically evaluating qualitative aspects of an
offender’s behaviors that show proof of intellectual
deficiencies. Tools such as the DABS show that such
evaluation need not be left up to subjective interpretation
but, rather, can be standardized and made interpretable on
the basis of quantifiable metrics. With its focus on individual
characteristics, modern adaptive behavior assessment
conforms to the Supreme Court’s mandate that capital

195. Id. at 1051–52.
196. Id. at 1052–53; see also Ellis et al., supra note 50, at 1316.
197. See Ellis et al., supra note 50, at 1316.
198. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 720 (2014) (“If the States were to have
complete autonomy to define intellectual disability . . . , the Court’s decision in
Atkins could become a nullity. . . .”).
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punishment be reserved for the most culpable offenders.199
This is a result that the Roper approach is less capable of
achieving, because the bright-line age threshold will fail to
exclude offenders who ought to be exempted under the very
rationale of the rule.200
B. Proposals for Evaluating Young Adult Offenders
Even if the Atkins approach is methodologically superior
to the Roper bright-line rule, the question is still whether
such an approach could be feasibly applied to young adult
offenders. Admittedly, tests of mental capacities of juveniles
and young adults are not at the same level of development as
those used in Atkins cases (i.e., IQ and adaptive behavior
tests). However, this fact does not warrant the conclusion
that such testing is infeasible or unrealistic. Indeed, based
on current science, there is ample reason to believe that tests
analogous to IQ or adaptive behavior tests could be
developed for use in young adult offender cases.
On this point, one key issue to note is that brain underdevelopment and its concomitant behavioral expressions are
already the subject of much empirical science. As a result, a
number of potential tools and techniques already exist that
may serve as the foundation of courtroom evaluations of
young adult offenders. Most noteworthy are brain imaging
technology and brain structuring studies. Current
neuroscience has gained a much clearer understanding of
what some call the “transitional age brain,” which extends
roughly from the years thirteen to twenty-five.201 During this
period, morbidity and mortality rates increase by 200%
compared to childhood.202 This stage of development is
199. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005).
200. See supra Section II.B.
201. Winston W. Chung et al., The Transitional Age Brain: “The Best of Times
and the Worst of Times,” 26 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM.
157, 157 (2017).
202. Id. at 162.
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marked by “high rates of accident, suicide, violence, and
health problems related to risky sexual behavior.”203
Current research suggests this phenomenon is
attributable to mismatches in the development of the
nucleus accumbens, the amygdala, and prefrontal cortices.204
The nucleus accumbens influences reward- and pleasureseeking behavior and matures earlier than the frontal and
prefrontal cortices, resulting in a “mismatch of drive without
control.”205 Meanwhile, the amygdala, the seat of emotions,
increases in volume during the transitional age period, and
is believed to cause adolescents to respond with “hot”
emotions rather than more controlled “cool” emotions.206
Eventually, the amygdala becomes more linked to activities
of the prefrontal cortex, resulting in greater emotional
regulation.207 As Winston W. Chung et al., explain, the
connectivity between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex
“signals an end to the [transitional age brain] period and the
beginning of a more neurologically regulated period known
as adulthood.”208
Another potential tool to gauge developmental status of
young adults is impulsivity, which has been widely assessed
using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale for over sixty years.209
Perhaps less well known, but equally impressive, is clinical
psychology’s assessment of “future orientation,” which has
gained more prominence in recent decades. Future
orientation refers generally to one’s ability to set future goals

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See generally Matthew S. Stanford et al., Fifty Years of the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale: An Update and Review, 47 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 385 (2009) (discussing the long-time clinical reliance on the scale).
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and plans.210 The study of future orientation is
multidimensional, with research on such issues as the
amount of time one thinks about or imagines the future,
one’s pessimism or optimism about the future, and one’s
beliefs that one’s current decisions are linked to future wellbeing.211 Research has suggested, for example, that focus on
the present is associated with risk-taking and that higher
levels of hope have been associated with less involvement in
violence.212 Delayed gratification is also a prominent area of
future orientation study.213 Methodologically, research on
future orientation has frequently involved the use of surveys
to assess subjects.214
A final area of study worth noting is the “maturity gap,”
an influential theory of adolescent delinquency and antisocial behavior developed by clinical psychologist Terrie E.
Moffitt.215 The maturity gap essentially postulates that
adolescents engage in delinquent or antisocial behavior in an
attempt to reconcile their growing biological maturity with
their lack of social maturity. That is, adolescents,
recognizing their physical likeness to adults, are nonetheless
treated as socially immature by society, trapping such
individuals in a “maturity gap.”216 Adolescent offenders rebel

210. Sarah Lindstrom et al., Future Orientation: A Construct with Implications
for Adolescent Health and Wellbeing, 26 INT’L J. ADOLESCENT MED. & HEALTH 459,
459 (2014).
211. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and
Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009).
212. Lindstrom et al., supra note 210, at 462.
213. Id. at 462.
214. See id. at 466–68.
215. J.C. Barnes et al., An Empirical Examination of Adolescence-Limited
Offending: A Direct Test of Moffitt’s Maturity Gap Thesis, 38 J. CRIM. JUSTICE
1176, 1176–78 (2010). See generally Terrie E. Moffitt, Life-Course-Persistent and
Adolescence-Limited Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100
PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993).
216. Barnes et al., supra note 215, at 1177. Examples of disparate treatment
include being prevented from voting, drinking, or making autonomous decisions.
Id.
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against their place in this gap by emulating the behavior of
other offenders and their “adult-like” activities.217 As the
maturity gap narrows, however, delinquency drops off.218 On
an empirical level, Moffitt’s theory has had some level of
predictive success. One study, for example, found that the
maturity gap hypothesis was a salient predictor of male drug
use and delinquency.219 The study relied primarily on selfreport questionnaires followed by interviews of study
subjects.220
The above sampling of current research presents hope
that a system of measurable, standardized criteria for
assessing young offender culpability may emerge. Brain
imaging and brain structure research, for example, was
immensely important to the Roper decision. As it stands
today, brain imaging is playing an increasing role in criminal
cases, with 5% of murder defendants and 25% of death
penalty defendants making use of neurobiological evidence
at trial.221 As our knowledge of the brain expands and brain
imaging technology progresses, identification of the
hallmarks of neurocognitive limitations that would qualify
offenders for death penalty exemption may be possible and
may even represent the most straightforward method of
evaluation.
In addition, it is notable that future orientation testing
relies on underlying methods of data gathering similar to
adaptive behavior testing, namely, interviews and surveys.
Future orientation surveys may include such inquiries as
“How often do you think about or plan your future?” or “[Are
you] able to resist temptations when [you] know that there is

217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1182.
220. Id. at 1178.
221. Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal
Law: An Empirical Analysis, 10 J. LAW & BIOSCIENCE 485, 486 (2016).
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work to be done[?]”222 Such questions seek to uncover the
same essential type of data as adaptive behavior testing, i.e.,
the behavior, skills, and conceptual abilities of the test
subject. It is worth pointing out that, although adaptive
behavior can be assessed on a numerical scale, the scale has
meaning only because of the fact that it has been normed
according to actual responses of intellectually disabled
people compared to people without intellectual disabilities.
Empirical future orientation research already employs
quantitative scale-based metrics to assess test subject data
and their correlative meaning.223 It stands to reason that
future orientation testing scales could be normed and
utilized similarly to adaptive behavioral scales.
V. ADDRESSING CRITICISM
The notion that an Atkins-like exemption could be
developed for young adult offenders is untested and, as such,
is subject to criticism. One reasonable concern is that the
proposal may suggest that Roper’s blanket exemption of
juveniles should be replaced by a uniform assessment
applicable to all young offenders, theoretically subjecting
juveniles once again to the death penalty. However, this
Comment does not advocate abandonment of the Roper
bright-line cut-off point as applied to juveniles. There may be
good reason to exempt juveniles as a class from the death
penalty without regard to their measurable intellectual
characteristics. One reason is that so many juveniles—
indeed, likely all juveniles—would inevitably be exempted by
a neurocognitive maturity assessment that it would be a
waste of a court’s time and resources to perform the analysis
in the first place. Another possible reason is the unique
repugnance with which society regards the execution of
juvenile offenders, justifying an unqualified exemption.
Thus, there are compelling reasons to retain the Roper
222. Lindstrom et al., supra note 210, at 467.
223. See Steinberg et al., supra note 211, at 34.
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bright-line rule for juveniles, even if other ages were subject
to a different test.
Another valid concern with taking an Atkins approach to
young adult offenders is that it may fail to exempt offenders
of relatively young ages due to their advanced neurocognitive
status. However, given that young adults largely develop
along a similar maturational curve, it is likely that an
attribute-centric approach will include most or all young
offenders. For those extraordinary cases that may exist—
such as a twenty-year-old with abnormally advanced
neurocognitive development—perhaps it is necessary to
concede that such individuals should be considered to have
the requisite culpability for death penalty eligibility under
current US laws. Recall that under present Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the death penalty is to be reserved for the
most culpable offenders. If a twenty-year-old meets the
culpability criteria on the basis of sound evidence, then
under the law as it stands today, that individual qualifies for
the death penalty. This result may certainly be unacceptable
to some, but I would suggest the issue ultimately derives
from abhorrence of capital punishment itself, not with the
consistency of the exemption framework outlined here. As
valid as concern over the legitimacy of the death penalty is,
it is outside the scope of this Comment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the Roper decision in 2005, a compelling argument
for exempting individuals under twenty-one from the death
penalty has emerged. Public opinion and sentencing
statistics, in particular, suggest American society is on the
cusp of adopting such an exemption. Proponents of the
exemption have advocated for the implementation of another
bright-line rule demarcating twenty-one as the maximum
age for death eligibility. However, bright-line age thresholds
are undesirable because of their arbitrariness and
discontinuity with the Supreme Court’s mandate that the
death penalty be reserved for the most culpable offenders. In
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contrast, the attribute-driven approach in Atkins is uniquely
suited to assessing culpability on the basis of individual
mental features. This Comment has sought to demonstrate
that the Atkins approach is capable of translation into the
sphere of young adult criminal culpability. As it stands,
many of the clinical tools and empirical frameworks used to
study young adult and adolescent behavior mirror those used
in the adaptive behavior assessments in Atkins’ cases. This
fact suggests attribute-driven measures of young adult
maturity (and hence, criminal culpability) are capable of
development for use in the courtroom. Adopting such an
approach obviates the difficulties raised by Roper and would
result in a categorical exemption for young adult offenders
that would more adequately conform to Supreme Court
capital punishment jurisprudence.

